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ABSTRACT

The study examined conflicts and challenges that impede the effectiveness of the UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) in the Congolese State. The study is based on the analytical review of secondary sources. Conflict has continued in the eastern Congo that has been the epicenter of all phases of Congolese wars. The conflict dynamics are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. The origin of the UN PKOs in Africa started in the Congolese State in 1960. Despite long year of deployment and being the world's largest PKO and the first to use the intervention brigade; Congolese state has remained conflict-stricken nation in Africa. For the first time, the UN PKO received one of the first Chapter VII mandates and intervention brigade that pushed the boundaries of accepted peacekeeping doctrine from peacekeeping mission to peace enforcement operations is in the Congolese state. Based on Barry Buzan's Security Complex as conceptual framework, the study uncovered that Congolese conflict is strongly linked into state politics and Regional security dynamics of the Great Lake Region. The regional politics and security complex and competitive regional states' power struggle to gain geopolitical power are seriously impeding the success of the UNPKO and challenging efforts to resolve Congolese conflicts. The Congolese state failure to do a catch by consolidating gains has remained the greatest challenges for the UNPKOs. Therefore, the study suggests strengthening Congolese state institutions and addressing the regional security dynamics to bring peace in the region.

Keywords: Conflicts, Congolese State, UN Peacekeeping Operation, Challenge, Great Lake Region and State Failure

1. **INTRODUCTION**

The United Nations Organization (UN) was formed among other reasons to maintain international peace and security (art.1 of UN Charter). For this end, however, the founders of the UN had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) as effective collective measure to maintain international peace. As a result, PKO was not mentioned in the original UN Charter. But, the PKO is often referred to as "Chapter VI" as it falls between provisions of Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Adisa, 1993). Chapter VI provides for pacific settlement of disputes whereas Chapter VII enables enforcement actions by the UN Security Council (UNSC). The origin of the PKO was possibly related with the UNSC deadlock to the collective security system during the Cold War due to ideological warfare and bipolar rivalry between Russia and USA. The end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in the UN and brought about multidimensional peacekeeping operations. In a new spirit of cooperation, the UNSC established larger and more complex PKOs often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements (Agada, 2008).

As per Chapter VI of the UN Charter, when conflicts or disputes occur between states, concerned parties are obligated to seek a solution by peaceful means. If the peaceful means fail and the dispute escalates into an armed conflict, then Chapter VII of the UN Charter comes into play. This constitutes the core of the UN Collective Security System (Berman and Sam, 2000). Chapter VII provides that UNSC may take enforcement measures, such as arms embargoes, complete or partial economic sanctions and in the last resort the use of military force to end breach of peace or an act of aggression to restore international peace and security. An example of the first actual PKO was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) operation in response to invasion of Egypt by Israel, France and UK in 1956 during the Suez Canal Crisis. The UNEF provided the model for classical PKO which requires the consent of the concerned parties and use of arms only for self-defense purpose. Its immediate objective was to facilitate conditions for a more comprehensive peace agreement (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1995).

The objective of the study is to examine the challenges that impede the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Congolese state (I use this names interchangeably) using Buzans Regional Security Complex Perspective. In terms of methodology, this study is based on document analysis and analytical review of the secondary sources. This study is organized into three major section and sub-sections. The first section, as briefly as possible, discusses the concept of Barry Buzan's security complex to use as conceptual framework to analyses the challenges that impede the effectiveness of the Peace Keeping Operation. The second part, discusses the historical overview of the Peacekeeping Operation in the Congolese state. Third section describes the challenges faced by the UN PKO in Congolese state. The last section is devoted to conclusions of the study.

2. BARRY BUZAN'S SECURITY COMPLEX PERSPECTIVE

Barry Buzan's pioneering study, *People, states and fear*, which is first published in 1983 and republished in 1991, was the first sustained and serious attempt to put forward guiding ideas pertaining to the concept of regional security. Buzan used and popularized the term 'security complex' to designate 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently and closely in that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another'(1991:190).   He attempts to put forward guiding ideas pertaining to the concept of regional security. His concept enables to 'talk about regional security in terms of the pattern of relations among members of the security complex' (Ayoob, 1995:58). These patterns are confined in a particular geographical area.

According to Buzan (1991:3), regional security refers to a weakly conceptualized but politically loaded concept that provides 'in itself, a more versatile, penetrating and useful way to approach the study of international relations than either power or peace'. Generally, it designates the condition, relative and never absolute, under which the state, the principal referent object, strives to safeguard its basic interests and organizational stability from internal vulnerabilities and mostly from external threats in an inescapably competitive international environment where states cannot ignore each other(ibid: 22–23). Buzan posits 'the existence of regional subsystems as objects of security analysis and offers an analytical framework for dealing with those systems' (Buzan et al, 1998: 11). His contribution to International Relations theory was mostly to draw 'attention away from the extremes of national and global security and focus it on the region, where these two extremes interplay and where most of the action occurs' (ibid: 14–15).

In security terms, a region means 'a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exist among a set of states whose fate is locked into geographical proximity with each other (Buzan, 1991:188). According to Buzan, military and political threats are more significant, potentially imminent and strongly felt when states are at close range. He further stressed that regional security systems can be seen in terms of balance of power as well as patterns of *amity* and of *enmity* arising from 'border disputes, interests in ethnically related populations and long-standing either negative or positive historical links (ibid:190). Therefore, Buzan's conceptual framework provides meaningful insights into how different types of conflict suddenly erupt and quickly spread in space and time. This perspective helps to 'see regional security in terms of pattern of relations among members of the security complex' (Ayoob, 1995:58). Accordingly, using this perspective as a study framework helps to link protracted conflicts in the Congolese state and Challenges that impede the effectiveness of PKO to regional security dynamics in the Great Lake Region and States' national interests.

3. THE HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF THE UN PEACE KEEPING OPERATION IN THE CONGOLESE STATE

The origin of the UN PKOs in Africa started in the Congolese State about 50 years ago. It was deployed in response to the Katanga secessionist crisis in 1960 and stayed until 1964 (Arieff, 2014). As mentioned by Sheldon (1987), 'the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold died in a plane crush while in a peace mission in the DRC (cited in Banda, 2012:29). After the end of the Cold War, several dozen military conflicts continue to rage the African Continent. With this increased conflict situations, there were an increased need for PKOs in Africa. Africa accounts for the highest number of the PKOs in the world. In addition to UN PKOs, African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) were also contributed significantly to peacekeeping efforts. The UN PKOs in Africa are still not as successful as they should have been (Agada, 2008). They are plagued by some challenges. Only few of these PKOs were successfully handled or resulted in lasting peace. Nearly, half of all countries in Africa that emerge from war lapse back into violence. Most of these conflicts are known to be contagious and thus have spill-over effects to other neighboring nations (ibid: 5).

By resolution 1258, the UNSC authorized the deployment of UN observer mission after the second Congolese war in August 1999 to monitor the implementation of Lusaka ceasefire agreement adopted under the auspices of UN and OAU in July 1999. In November 1999, Resolution 1279 affirmed that previously authorized UN personnel would constitute a UNO mission in the DRC called MONUC (Cammaert, 2013; Reyntjens, 2009). Resolution 1565, adopted in 2004, increased MONUC personnel, with a primary objective of MONUC deployment to eastern Congo to ensure

civilian protection. Resolution 1291 provided MONUC the mandate, under Chapter VII, which allows peacekeepers to use force to protect Congolese civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, its personnel and facilities (Dagne, 2011). Over the past decade, the UNSC passed a number of resolutions to strengthen MONUC and its mandate. Despite Joseph Kabila's request for the withdrawal of MONUC, the UNSC passed Resolution that renamed the mission from MONUC to United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010 (ibid; Cammaert, 2013).

After nearly 14 years of deployment in the DRC, the UNSC established intervention brigade from South African Development Communities (SADC) countries (South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi) under the command of the MONUSCO in March 2013. The intervention brigade marks another step change in the UN PKO. It is a new and more aggressive kind of offensive combat force to protect civilians by carrying out targeted operations to neutralize rebel forces. The intervention brigade is designed as the first-ever UN "offensive" combat force to break the persistent cycles of conflict in the Conflict-stricken Congolese state and disarm the rebel groups (MONUSCO, 2014). It is mentioned that the DRC has long been a testing ground for evolving UN PKOs in the world. It was in DRC that a PKO received one of the first Chapter VII mandates and intervention brigade. The MONUSCO is the world's largest operation in terms of personnel and cost. The MONUSCO is also a unique mission that functions in one of the most complex operating environments in the world. It recently became the first mission approved to receive unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance purposes (Cammaert, 2013; Arieff, 2014).

Despite nearly 14 years long deployment and being the world's largest PKO and the first to use the intervention brigade, MONUSCO has had limited success in protecting Congolese civilians (MONUSCO, 2014; Cammaert, 2013). The DRC has remained conflict-stricken nation in the world. The eastern DRC, a mineral-rich and densely populated region bordering Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, has continued to suffer from recurring cycles of conflicts and persistent violence by armed groups. The cycle of conflict has not only been bloody, it has been brutal, characterized by sexual atrocities, leading the UN to name the DRC "the rape capital of the world (Stearns, 2012; Banda, 2012).

The MONUSCO's intervention brigade militarily defeated the M23 rebel movement. The existing Congolese and foreign rebels groups and militias were undergone relative weakness due to joint offensive military operations by the national army, named as Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and intervention Brigade (MONUSCO, 2014). Their access to the most lucrative mines being cut off. However, much remains to be done to bring sustainable peace in the eastern DRC. Consolidating gains and bringing security to liberated territories have remained the greatest challenges due to Congolese state failure to do a catch up. Many challenge both Congolese and regional have been impeding the effectiveness of MONUSCO.

4. **Challenges for UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Congolese State**

4.1. **Regional Security Complex in the Great Lake Region and its Challenges**

The Great Lake Region (GLR) forms part of the rift valley in east and central Africa and comprises seven countries: Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, Angola, Burundi, Kenya and Tanzania. On the other hand, smaller Great Lake Region (SGLR) consists of Eastern DRC (Kivus), Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. The discussion on regional security complex as challenge for the success of UNPKO in the Congolese state is focused on SGLR. The concept of 'security Complex' provides meaningful and deeper insights into the complex conflict trends in the SGLR. Consistent to the main tenet of the Security Complex, states in the SGLR are confined in a particular geographical area and proximity with each other. The national security of these states is link together and may not be realized apart from one another. It is therefore necessary to analyze Congolese conflicts and challenges that hamper the success of UN PKO from the perspective of these states geopolitical dynamics, regional security complex and pattern of state relations.

The current prolonged conflict in the eastern DRC is very complex due to profusion of armed factions both Congolese and foreign rebels and continuing involvement of neighboring countries under the pretext of pursuing rebels (Stearns, 2012; Arieff, 2014). The region has generated a multitude of armed groups with over two dozen emerging over the past two decades. It is in the Kivus, the epicenter of instability in the SGLR, that the most formidable challenges to stability in the DRC and neighboring countries persist today (Banda, 2012; Stearns, 2012). Over the past decades, the former Rwandan rebel forces named as Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) use eastern Congo as safe haven and carried out many attacks against civilians in Rwanda and DRC. The Ugandan rebels, like a Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU), were also basing in the DRC and conducting terrible attacks against civilians. In addition, the Burundian rebel group, like the National Liberation Forces (FNL) was also present in the DRC (Dagne, 2011; Stearns, 2012). These foreign rebel forces continue to operate in the eastern DRC and are destabilizing the regional security.

The Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian governments views these rebels as a national security threat. As a result, they have been involving frequently in the Congolese wars directly or via proxies by the pretext of pursing

these rebel groups. These states were primary actors in all phases of Congolese wars and continue to sustain the recurring cycles of conflicts and instability in the DRC. This has made the Congolese wars very complex that involve a multiplicity of interlocking regional and international actors (Stearns, 2012; Reyntjens, 2009; Cammaert, 2013). The conflict has expanded geographically and involved the countries of SGLR which is a comparatively confined geographical area and a history of colonial and ethnic interdependence (Ewald, 2004). Corresponding to the tenets of Buzan's Security complex, the conflict is strongly felt and linked into politics and security of the states of SGLR's. Therefore, the countries of the region are illustrative example of Buzan's Security Complex as the fate of these states' security has always been inextricably intertwined to each other.

Moreover, corresponding to the tenets of Security Complex thesis, historical patterns of enmity than amity are deeply etched in the SGLR states that has made peace building effort difficult in the DRC. Since the second Congolese war, enmity had continued to endure between DRC and its smaller but more powerful neighbors - Rwanda and Uganda (Arieff, 2014, Cammaert, 2013). Rwanda and Uganda were continued to involve in the Congolese conflicts and to cultivate rebel groups as proxies. It is such shared rivalry that sustain the cycles of conflicts in the DRC and in the SGLR. The regional states destabilization role and enmity is one of the critical challenges for the success of MONUSCO in the DRC.

Due to persistent threats emanating from their respective rebel groups operating in the DRC, the regional states have national security concerns. They have also overlapping ethnic populations along the border. As a result, they have very high and complex stake in the Congolese conflicts (Stearns, 2012; Reyntjens, 2009). These are therefore the solid indication that the regional security complex has been escalating and sustaining the cycles of conflicts in the DRC and in the smaller and larger Great Lake Region. This remains critical challenges for MONUSCO success in the DRC. Beyond security concern, regional states have vested interests in plundering and exploiting the Congolese rich mineral resources either through covert support for rebel groups or in actual military engagement.

Cognizant of the fact that conflict in the DRC cannot be addressed solely within its borders due to critical regional dimension; a Regional Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework was adopted in February 2013. It was adopted to address the underlying causes of Congolese conflicts and foster trust between neighbors. It was the UN-brokered framework signed by eleven African nations. In accordance with the framework, this broader strategy must be driven by national political actors with the support of regional powers (Cammaert, 2013). As per the agreement reached at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in July 2012, the UN Security Council (UNSC) announced the deployment of the intervention brigade within the MONUSCO on 28 March 2013. It is a new in the UN PKOs history and more aggressive kind of force to offensively engage with the rebel groups in eastern DRC (Arieff, 2014; MONUSCO, 2014). The UN has stressed the regional nature of the Brigade and has urged further talks and commitment among political leaders in the region to a joint solution to break the cycle of persistent turmoil in the DRC, which impacts their border and regional security.

After military defeat of M23 rebel group by the intervention brigade and relative improvement in the relation between DRC and its powerful neighbors, Uganda and Rwanda, some progress in addressing recurrent conflict were achieved since 2013. However, mutual trust between DRC and its neighbors is still fragile (MONUSCO, 2014). The Congolese state remains a failed state and the east is still afflicted by recurring cycles of conflict and violence (Reyntjens, 2009). Making the MONUSCO successful in restoring peace in the DRC to a large extent depends on breaking the cycle of neighboring state intervention in the conflict and addressing the regional security complex. The MONUSCO has no mandate to fight the rebels. The Chapter VII mandate is limited to use force to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The MONUSCO cannot stop external regional actors to halt flows of funding and equipment to rebel groups (Cammaert, 2013). As these rebel groups both Congolese and foreign are self-sufficient by controlling mining areas to fund the war and also supported by powerful neighboring states and other external actors, defeating them would require removing their lifelines of resource basis, finance, weapons and addressing regional security complex. Destroying these rebel groups and breaking their support line is beyond the mandate and capacity of the MONUSCO in the DRC.

4.2. **Congolese State Failure**

Some scholars have depicted 'state failure' as an essentially contested concept. As a result, scholars face various analytical problems in defining state failure and hence, rely on chosen indicators to conceptualize the state failure (Vogel, 2011). To analyze the Congolese state failure as a critical challenge to MONUSCO's efforts to maintain peace and ongoing protracted conflict, I use Rotberg's indicators of failed state as a conceptual framework. These indicators provide adequate unit of analysis to the case of the DRC. Rotberg has given broadly accepted and guiding indicators pertaining to the concept of failed state. His lists of indicators include : civil wars characterized by enduring violence; disharmony between communities; loss of control over peripheral regions to out-groups; growth of criminal violence, including gangs, and trafficking of arms and guns; cessation of functioning legislatures and judiciaries; informal privatization of social services; corruption; loss of legitimacy; declining per capita GDP, with associated soaring smuggling and the supplanting of the national currency with external money (2004:5-9).

However, Rotberg does not explicitly define what a 'failing state' is, but it is presumably a state that exhibits some, but not all, of the above indicators of state failure. A core part of Rotberg"s argumentation consists of the notion that failed states are "not longer able or willing" to fulfill their responsibilities (ibid: 5).   Seen from the perspective of Rotberg's indicators of failed state, the DRC is an example in numerous regards. The DRC is one of the countries in the world that frequently cited as failed state. It is certainly an extreme environment for peacekeeping (Arieff, 2014). The challenges to resolve recurring cycles of conflicts is Congolese state failure. As a result, vast geography with abundant resources is mismanaged and uncontrolled and plundered by internal and external forces that in turn sustain conflicts. Corruption is endemic in the country (Cammaert, 2013; Arieff, 2014).

Congolese Conflicts couldn't be resolved by MONUSCO's military means alone. The Congolese state has primary responsibility to build strong state institutions to control and govern its territory, protect its unity and territorial integrity and security of its people. As mentioned by Patrick Cammaert[1], the UN has also stressed 'the DRC's responsibility to build a stable environment, acknowledging that "one underlying reason for the recurring cycles of conflicts and violence involving Congolese and foreign armed groups is the government's limited ability to exert full authority over its territory and to provide basic services and security to the population'(2013:12). The DRC remains a fragile state though Joseph Kabila has been in power since 2001. Kabila has made only limited progress, if any, in building strong state institutions to advance constitutionally stable political order. As a result, the Congolese state has a dysfunctional government with limited authority over its territory outside the capital. It has no effective state institution to govern its territory, especially in the eastern region (Banda, 2012; Stearns, 2012).

 Furthermore, the DRC has few passable roads, little infrastructure and poor or no provision of social services to its people. The Congolese political elites often appear more focused on controlling resources and augmenting their personal power than creating effective state institutions and fostering socio-economic development (Stearns, 2012). In addition, the Congolese as well as elites of Kigali and Kampala have developed a stake in rebel groups, which they believe maintain their interests (ibid). Jason Stearns has further mentioned that:

> <<Almost every rebel group has leadership ties with Kinshasa, Goma, or Kigali. Indeed, an essential ingredient for long-term success for any rebel group is a solid connections to regional elites, who contribute money and equipment, broker larger alliances with other armed groups and politicians—and who can speak for the rebels in the inevitable peace talks (Stearns, 2012:42)>>.

The DRC is the second largest and very rich country in mineral resources in Africa. However, the Congolese state has neither the rule of law nor the force of law to manage resources and suppress armed groups that operate freely by plundering and smuggling mining resources to fund their battles (McCloskey, 2010). The Congolese government has consistently demonstrated inability to protect its territorial integrity and control its natural resources from plundering by the rebels groups. Consistent to Rotberg's indicators of the failed state, Congolese state is dominated by resource traders, smugglers, arms dealers and corrupt national and local officials. There is no effective state authority in the mineral rich eastern Congo. As a result, the region is rife with various rebel groups and local, regional and international smugglers (Nibishaka, 2011).

 The rebel groups that used eastern Congo as safe haven, such as the Rwandan FDLR, Ugandan ADF/NALU and LRA and Congolese Mai Mai militias and other armed forces apparently sustain their operations by trading lucrative minerals. They have their own mines areas to finance war inside and outside DRC (De Koning, 2010). Corresponding to Rotberg's indicators of failed state, cessation of functioning state institutions, smuggling, proliferation of small arms and light weapons facilitate impunity and hinder the implementation of effective strategies to alter incentive structures in the DRC's war economy (Shekawat, 2009). The protracted conflict has led to the Congolese state failure which has in turn been sustaining the cycle of conflicts by supporting the survival of rebel groups in addition to external supports from influential and difficult neighbors (Arieff, 2014; Camaert, 2013). Therefore, the political economy of mining is central to sustaining the cycle of conflicts in the eastern Congo.

The Congolese state has very weak national army, named as FARDC. The army is poorly paid, badly equipped, and in need of extensive reform. Low pay and poor discipline were led members of the armed forces to desert to rebel sides and to extort payment of illegal checkpoint "taxes" from the population in areas under their control. In addition, Congolese forces have fled when rebel groups have attacked their locations and have themselves been responsible for large numbers of human rights violations (Dagne, 2011:10). While MONUSCO able to clear rebel-held territory, the FARDC has no capacity to consolidate these gains and guards the liberated areas against rebels' reprisal (Cammaert, 2013). As mentioned by Patrick Cammaert, UN has repeatedly noted that "the lack of progress towards building well-trained and well equipped Congolese armed forces constitutes a major threat to the stability of

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[1] Patrick Cammaert was former military advisor in the United Nations Department of Peace keeping Operations and former Eastern Division commander of the UN Mission in the DRC.

the DRC and the high number of atrocities committed by the FARDC presents wider challenges for partnership" (2013:10). The FARDC is little more than a collection of former rebels themselves. It struggles to militarily defeat the well-armed and well-resourced rebel groups while it is poorly equipped and has very bad discipline. The military leaders of FARDC have involved in the war economy and intensely competing to control mineral rich areas for personal fiat as the rebels have been doing (De Koning, 2010).

The Congolese state failure is internal mainly political. It remains key challenges for achieving greater stability by the MONUSCO in the DRC (Arieff, 2014; Cammaert, 2013). From a peacekeeping perspective, the already complex and very vast Congolese geographic area of MONUSCO's operations is hampered by poor infrastructure and lack of state authority at local and peripheral areas. The MONUSCO is dependent on scarce and expensive aviation to access the remote areas of operation in the DRC (Mpangala, 2004; Cammaert, 2013). Majority of MONUSCO's troops have been located in the east of the DRC, stretching over a distance of nearly 1,500 miles through the Province of Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Katanga (Cammaert, 2013:3). Given the size of the area of operations with very challenging terrain and poor infrastructure and number of rebel groups operating in the DRC, the MONUSCO could not bring alone a lasting peace while the Congolese state has dysfunctional state institutions (De Koning, 2010; Arieff, 2014).

4.3. Lack of Capacity by UN Peacekeeping Operations

Despite history of nearly 14 years of deployment, the MONUSCO's static approach to the protection of civilians has proven insufficient (MONUSCO, 2014). The MONUSCO forces are relatively not very robust, flexible, highly mobile, well trained and fully able to deploy across the whole of eastern DRC. Despite Chapter VII mandate and being one of the largest PKO in the world, the MONUSCO has proved incapable to protect civilians from attacks and to effectively deal with rebel groups until the establishment of intervention brigade in March 2013 (Cammaert, 2013). For instance, the M23 rebel captured the city of Goma and committed huge human atrocity in November 2012 despite the presence of MONUSCO troops and the FARDC in the city (Arieff, 2014). The MONUSCO had no attempted to deter M23's advance and protected civilian in Goma. The fall of Goma and human rights violations that followed were proved inability of the MONUSCO to take decisive action as per Chapter VII mandate (Arieff, 2014).

Cognizant of the MONUSCO's failure to fully carry out its mandates, the UN adopted a radical proposition and a step change to PKO in the DRC to address the rebel threat. The UN has deployed an intervention brigade, the first-ever combat force in the UN PKOs history, to carry out targeted offensive operations in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner against the rebels in the DRC. It is clear that this brigade represents a shift from peacekeeping mission to peace enforcement operations in the DRC. Congolese UN PKO is thus pushing the boundaries of accepted peacekeeping doctrine (MONUSCO, 2014). The new UN initiative is contributing to restoring the territorial integrity of DRC despite Congolese state failure to do a catch up. The new intervention brigade militarily defeated the rebel movement in 2013. The deployment of intervention brigade has thus enhanced the capacity of the MONUSCO in deterring rebel attacks on civilians and uniting regional powers in stemming arms flows and funding to rebel groups.

5. Conclusions

Conflict has continued in the eastern Congo which has been the epicenter of all phases of Congolese wars. It is here that the most formidable challenges to Congolese stability persist today. The ongoing Congolese conflict that has generated a multitude of armed groups is among the most complicated in the Africa. The causes of the conflicts are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. The SGLR is the epicenter of the conflict earthquake in the larger GLR and in Africa. This region's security complex has significant contribution in sustaining the cycles of conflict in the DRC and regional insecurity. It is a regional factor that impedes MONUSCO's success in restoring stability. The DRC's neighboring states have engaged in pervasive backing of rebel groups and involved in the war economy directly or through proxies. Another key challenge to break the recurring cycles of conflicts is a regional security dynamics and a competitive regional states' power struggle to gain geopolitical power in ways that are threatening to the security of other states.

Nearly 14 years after deployment, MONUSCO is still struggling to break the cycles of conflicts. The MONUSCO's support in the military front has relatively advanced as demonstrated by military defeat over M23 rebel group. However, the Congolese government is lagging behind and has failed to do a catch up to consolidate the gains. The non-military solutions through peacemaking and state building to address the underlying causes are still very fragile in the DRC. The rebel groups in DRC remain a threat to stability in the region and to civilians who are frequently targeted in their attacks. The conflict in the DRC is extremely entrenched and may not be addressed by step change in the PKO. The underlying causes of the conflict are war economy, regional security complex and Congolese state failure. Therefore, these deep-rooted causes of conflicts could not be addressed by military means alone by changing steps in the PKO in the DRC. It is better to pursue holistic approach by the Congolese state, the

UN, SADC, and the regional powers to bring lasting peace in the SGLR. To win peace with conviction and persistence and to consolidate the gains achieved, transforming Congolese state failure is a priority. Efforts should be geared towards building strong state institutions to end the state failure.

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